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Abstract
There has been a recent growth in philosophy of psychiatry that draws heavily (although not
exclusively) on analytic philosophy with the aim of a better understanding of psychiatry through an
analysis of some of its fundamental concepts. This 'new philosophy of psychiatry' is an addition to
both analytic philosophy and to the broader interpretation of mental health care. Nevertheless, it
is already a flourishing philosophical field. One indication of this is the new Oxford University Press
series International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry seven volumes of which (by Bolton and
Hill; Bracken and Thomas; Fulford, Morris, Sadler, and Stanghellini; Hughes, Louw, and Sabat;
Pickering; Sadler; and Stanghellini) are examined in this critical review.
Background: the recent past
Philosophy of psychiatry in the English-speaking world
has broad historical roots, ranging across many traditions
of thought in Europe, the UK and the USA. The phenom-
enological-existential tradition of psychoanalytic theory,
Anglo-American analytic philosophy and streams of the
Continental tradition have all influenced and shaped the
field. However, in recent years there has been a growth in
philosophy of psychiatry which draws heavily (although
not exclusively) on broadly analytic philosophy and
which aims to at a better understanding of psychiatry
through an analysis of some of its fundamental concepts.
This 'new philosophy of psychiatry' is thus a compara-
tively recent addition to both analytic philosophy and to
the broader interpretation of mental health care. Never-
theless, it is already a flourishing philosophical field. Over
the last fifteen years or so there has been considerable
research activity in this area. Signs of that activity include:
• the launch of the journal Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psy-
chology in 1994 co-edited in the US and UK, supported by
the Association for the Advancement of Philosophy and
Psychiatry (AAPP) which fosters close associations with
the American Psychiatric Association.
￿ the two main centres of excellence in the UK: the masters
programme in philosophy of mental disorder at King's
College London and the new Institute for Philosophy,
Diversity and Mental Health at the University of Central
Lancashire which will shortly launch its own distance
learning masters in Philosophy and Mental Health based
on the Oxford Textbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry.
￿ the established annual series of International Confer-
ences on Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology which
has met recently in Florence, Heidelberg, Yale and Leiden
and will be at Sun City, South Africa in 2007. Conferences
are planned till 2012.
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￿ the creation of a Special Interest Group in Philosophy
within the Royal College of Psychiatrists in the UK, which
currently has over 1200 members.
In addition, the new Oxford University Press book series
International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry –
which also includes the Companion to the Philosophy of Psy-
chiatry [1] and the Oxford Textbook of Philosophy and Psychi-
atry [2] – has now published more than ten volumes. It
seems therefore that now is a particularly appropriate time
to examine the developing field as well as reviewing 7 of
the IPPP titles below.
As well as its youth, the new philosophy of psychiatry has
two further features that make it stand out. Firstly, it is not
a 'natural kind'. By that we mean that there is not an estab-
lished set of inter-related problems with familiar, if rival,
solutions. Published work is, instead, generally drawn
from parent sub-disciplines within philosophy such as
philosophy of mind, of science and of values and ethics.
It is an area where philosophical methods, accounts and
theories can be applied to psychiatric phenomena and
thus it also serves to test those accounts. To take one type
of example, psychopathology is a test track for theories in
the philosophy of mind. Symptoms such as thought inser-
tion, where subjects experience their thoughts as some-
how not their own, challenge accounts of the everyday
'ownership' of thoughts. But there is also traffic the other
way. Three centuries of discussing the relationship of
mind and body have furnished philosophers with a vari-
ety of subtle models (from forms of dualism, through gra-
dations of physicalism, to eliminativism with modern
alternatives such as enactivism) which can help in the
interpretation of psychiatric data.
Secondly, unlike some areas of philosophy, philosophy of
psychiatry can have a genuine impact on practice. It is a
philosophy of, and for, mental health care. It provides
tools for critical understanding of contemporary practices,
and of the assumptions on which mental health care more
broadly, and psychiatry more narrowly, are based. Thus it
is not merely an abstract area of thought and research, of
interest only to academics. In providing a deeper, clearer
understanding of the concepts, principles and values
inherent in everyday thinking about mental health, psy-
chiatric diagnoses and the theoretical drivers of mental
health policy, it can impact directly on the lives of people
involved in all aspects of mental health care.
A brief examination of the history of the subject reveals
why the discipline of psychiatry is particularly suited to
contributions from philosophy. Whilst the father of psy-
chopathology, the German philosopher and psychiatrist
Karl Jaspers, combined psychiatric and philosophical
expertise, within the English speaking tradition philoso-
phy and psychiatry went their separate ways throughout
most of the twentieth century. (By contrast, in mainland
Europe the connection between psychiatry and phenom-
enological philosophy has continued since Jaspers' day.)
But towards the end of the twentieth century, the rise of
the anti-psychiatry movement prompted a resurgence of
philosophical interest in psychiatry. This was because a
key element of the anti-psychiatric criticism of mental
health care turned on a contentious claim about the
nature of mental illness: mental illness does not exist; it is
a myth. Such a sceptical claim is paradigmatically philo-
sophical and one of the main proponents of anti-psychia-
try, the psychiatrist Thomas Szasz, put forward a number
of philosophical arguments in support of it. These turned
on the fact that psychiatric diagnosis is essentially evalua-
tive. From this he concluded that, unlike physical illness,
it could not be medically treated because as illness it was
not real. (The apparent reality of mental illness is best
explained, according to Szasz, as the reality of non-medi-
cally treatable life problems.)
Szasz's sceptical arguments spurred responses by both
psychiatrists and philosophers questioning whether diag-
nosis is, after all, essentially evaluative and, if it is,
whether Szasz's conclusions followed. Thus the analysis
of mental illness, and the role of values in that analysis,
lies at the heart of recent philosophy of psychiatry.
In addition to the importance of values, two further key
areas of mental health care prompt immediate philosoph-
ical questioning. Firstly, psychiatry since Jaspers has
sought to balance two key elements: investigation of the
bio-medical facts and empathic investigation of subjects'
experiences. Both bio-medical facts and meanings
(broadly construed to include experiences, beliefs and
utterances) need somehow to be integrated into mental
health care. This marks a sharp delineation from other
areas of medicine where subjects' experiences are subordi-
nate to the physically described symptoms and organic
pathology with which they present. By contrast, psychiat-
ric disorders seem to involve problems of the 'self' (how-
ever this is construed) in which experiences, behaviour
and beliefs play a fundamentally important role in the
onset, course and recovery of symptoms.
This raises questions of both the nature of the distinction
between explanation according to the canons of the natu-
ral sciences (the 'realm of law') and understanding mean-
ingful connections (in the 'space of reasons') and the
relationship between natural scientific facts and meanings.
If there is a clear distinction and meanings are conceptu-
ally irreducible to biomedical facts, efforts to understand
the nature of this relationship become all the more philo-
sophically interesting.Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:9 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/9
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Secondly, there has been much work by psychiatrists since
the Second World War to develop psychiatric classifica-
tion or taxonomy. This has, historically, been in response
to a concern about a lack of agreement or reliability about
psychiatric diagnosis. More recently, there has been grow-
ing concern that reliability has been improved but only at
the cost of validity, or underlying truth, of classificatory
schemas. The worry is that psychiatric diagnostic systems
may not 'carve nature at the joints'. This concern has also
been reflected in philosophy of psychiatry as an instance
of a broader question of the role of science in mental
health care.
The International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry
series already contains a number of different works which
begin to show the wide variety contained within philoso-
phy of psychiatry, some of which we review in more detail
below. In accord with the comments above, three broad
interconnected themes are already clear. They concern:
￿ the role of values in psychiatric diagnosis and treatment;
￿ the question of the place of understanding subjects'
experiences, their meanings and the relationship of
understanding to natural scientific explanation
￿ the scientific status of the 'facts' or 'evidence' that con-
tribute towards psychiatric diagnoses
This is not to say that the books discussed below fit neatly
into just one of the categories. John Sadler's Values and
Psychiatric Diagnosis, for example, concerns the interplay
of values and scientific evidence. Whilst Pat Bracken and
Phil Thomas' Postpsychiatry focuses mainly on the third
aspect, it has something to say about the other two areas
as well. Nevertheless, it is useful to think of these as form-
ing the main foci of work in this area to provide some
kind of overview of a diverse field.
We will now turn to seven of the works recently published
in the Oxford University Press International Perspectives in
Philosophy and Psychiatry series.
The present: International Perspectives in 
Philosophy and Psychiatry 
John Sadler Values and Psychiatric Diagnosis
John Sadler's Values and Psychiatric Diagnosis [3] looks to
be concerned with the first area of our three-part distinc-
tion: values. But, in fact, it is equally concerned with the
third area: the nature of the scientific project of framing
psychiatric classification. Values and classification go
hand in hand for reasons that will become clear.
The book starts with two key claims. Firstly, he claims that
psychiatry is thoroughly charged with values but, at the
same time, it disguises or denies the role that values play.
Thus one key aim of his book is to explore the multiple
roles of values in a variety of different areas. These include
broad themes such as the patient and professional roles,
technology, culture and politics. But it also concerns more
specific areas of psychiatric interest such as sex and gender
and genetics.
Sadler's second key claim follows from a further assump-
tion he makes. Because classification lies at the heart of
the scientific self-image of the profession, light can be
shed on psychiatry by looking at psychiatric classification
in particular.
Why does this relate back to values? This stems from an
initially surprising result of examining the evidence. Pub-
lished expressions of the aims for, and methodological
assumptions of, recent DSM and ICD classifications in
their introductions and so forth reveals a striking consist-
ency. But at the same time, the evolution of psychiatric
classification over the last fifty years has been anything
but gradual. This presents a tension:
We seem to have a paradox: the psychiatric nosologists
seem to develop a significant degree of consensus
about what they want in a diagnostic system, yet sub-
stantial changes occur over the years – even dramatic
ones. How does this occur? What forces shape the
changes? [4]
Of course, one response to this question might have been
that empirical findings have driven the changes. But
Sadler suggests that this is not the right answer which
should, instead, be derived from Thomas Kuhn's analysis
of science. Just as Kuhn argued that values play a key role
in explaining scientific disputes so changes in classifica-
tion can be best explained through disagreements about
the values that play an essential role in scientific psychia-
try. Thus Values and Psychiatric Diagnosis examines the role
that values play across a variety of contexts but it takes
classification to be of central importance because by look-
ing to the values that drive it, light can be shed on psychi-
atry as a whole.
Admirably for work in this area, Sadler spends some time
giving an overview of what he understands values to be.
Following the influence of pragmatist philosophy he takes
them to guide actions and also to justify praise or blame.
He distinguishes between 'thick' and 'thin' value-terms,
value-semantics, value-commitments, value-entailments,
and value-consequences and also suggests that there is a
variety of kinds of value: aesthetic, ethical, pragmatic,
epistemic, and ontological. With this framework in place
the bulk of the book sets about unpacking and analysingPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:9 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/9
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the value commitments and disagreements in a number
of areas of psychiatry.
Given the broad canvas of the investigation it is perhaps
unsurprising that no single line of argument emerges. But
one interesting discussion arises in the chapter on sex and
gender. Having outlined the recent history of diagnoses of
homosexuality, gender identity disorder and paraphilia,
Sadler suggests that these reveal a fundamental difficulty
for psychiatry. He quotes a qualification made in the
DSM-IV definition of disorder:
Neither deviant behaviour (eg. political, religious, or
sexual) nor conflicts that are primarily between the
individual and society are mental disorders unless the
deviance or conflict is a symptom of a dysfunction in
the individual. [5]
But, as Sadler argues, this raises a question of how one
does define disorder.
One difficulty with this DSM rubric, and one that lim-
its its applicability to the issue of unconventional sex-
ual practices or gender behaviour, is how one
determines whether a given behaviour or set of behav-
iours is dysfunctional. [6]
Having already argued that diagnosis is essentially evalu-
ative, Sadler suggests that the history of psychiatry's
approach to sex and gender issues reveals that the values
contained are often moral. He goes on to make the sugges-
tion that, in general, psychiatric diagnosis would be
improved if classifications that at present contain largely
moral values could be replaced by non-moral values,
'adding a dimension of "sickness" to the dimension of
"wrongfulness"' [7]. One advantage of the proposal is that
it might reduce the amount of disagreement about consti-
tutive values and thus add to clinical reliability.
This positive suggestion, albeit rather guarded, is an exam-
ple of the kind of suggestion made in the final chapter for
the future of the DSM. There, the key proposition is that
values of clinical and administrative utility of DSM-IV
should be replaced by the ultimate aim of aiding the men-
tally ill. Further, rather than concentrating narrowly on ill-
health and a correlative notion of health it should focus
explicitly on a broader notion of well-being or the Greek
notion of eudaimonia. This would be to make the new
DSM more explicitly evaluative and political. But, Sadler
argues, it is better to make this explicit and thus subject to
openly democratic control rather than letting it remain
hidden and implicit.
Two features of Sadler's placement of values at the heart of
his analysis of classification deserve further note. One is
that, because it concerns the role of values in psychiatry,
Sadler suggests at the start of Values and Psychiatric Diagno-
sis that it is merely the beginning of a conversation. The
implication is that one should not expect to command
agreement on such matters which call for political debate.
(That said, Sadler himself opposes value-subjectivism and
thinks that there is significant fact-like consensus about at
least some values [8].)
Secondly, alongside discussion of aesthetic, ethical, prag-
matic and epistemic values Sadler also discusses what he
calls ontological values. These are connected to the
assumptions about nature or reality and constrain the
approach taken to psychiatric classification. Thus Sadler
contrasts the biological naturalism that dominates psychi-
atry with other perspectives such as transpersonal, social
constructionist and existential-phenomenological in
order to reveal the assumptions in play. But here the cen-
trality of values works least well. Had he instead treated
these more directly as competing claims about reality that
could be assessed for their truth he would have had
sharper critical tools. By looking at them instead as prima-
rily matters of value he makes assessment of their relative
merits essentially indirect. It remains, however, an impres-
sive demonstration of the role of applied philosophical
analysis to the future development of psychiatric theory.
Neil Pickering The Metaphor of Mental Illness
We suggested at the start of this review that analytic phi-
losophy of psychiatry was reborn in the effort to come to
grips with the status of mental illness. The Metaphor of
Mental Illness [9] attempts to diagnose why there is contin-
uing disagreement about the status of mental illness
despite careful analysis. Neil Pickering argues that this is,
in part, because of shared dependence on what he calls the
'likeness argument' which, he argues, is fundamentally
flawed.
According to Pickering, the likeness argument is supposed
to resolve the status of mental illness by showing that
putative mental illness is, indeed, sufficiently like illness.
It does this in one of two ways: either, it takes a paradig-
matic form of illness, a specific case like hypertension or
physical illness more generally, and shows that mental ill-
ness is sufficiently like it because it shares sufficient of its
features; or, it abstracts a generic concept of illness (again,
typically from physical illness) and shows that mental ill-
ness fits sufficient features of that general concept to count
as illness.
Why, then, does the likeness argument fail to settle the
matter? Pickering argues that it depends on two assump-
tions both of which can be questioned. He says:Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:9 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/9
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If the likeness argument is to resolve this dispute two
things must, I think, be taken to be the case:
1. that there are features of human conditions such
as schizophrenia, which decide what category, or
kind, these conditions area member of, and
2. that, with respect to the presence or absence of
these features, a condition such as schizophrenia is
describable independent of the category it is
assigned to. [10]
The first is a general condition derived from a view of how
concepts apply to things. The suggestion is that concepts
apply in virtue of conditions having objective features.
This stands in contrast, for example, to a view where all
such concept application depends on an imaginative
human judgement. The second is a more specific assump-
tion relevant to the debate about mental illness. It is that
the ascription of features to conditions – putative illnesses
– can be made independently of a top down decision as to
the illness-status of those conditions.
Pickering suggests that both assumptions can be ques-
tioned. But the more robust 'strong objection' turns on
questioning the second assumption. His claim here is that
ascription of features to conditions – putative illnesses –
depends on the overall category – illness or not – into
which they are placed. The argument for this is piecemeal.
In each of three cases – alcoholism, attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), schizophrenia – he offers
competing descriptions of their basic features manifesting
first an assumption that they are illnesses and second that
they are not. The behavioural features of alcoholism, for
example, can equally be described in terms of moral weak-
ness or of causally determined pathological behaviour.
The same data can be equally well interpreted in the light
of opposing top-down theories. Pickering concludes: 'The
detectable and observable features of alcoholism do not
determine what description should be given of them' [11].
Arguing that this is a general feature of such contested
cases, Pickering concludes that the features themselves
cannot be used to determine to which overall category the
condition belongs.
The second and third sections of the book develop an
alternative account of mental illness based on an account
of metaphor. The idea is that calling mental illness 'illness'
is a metaphorical extension of the use of the word 'illness'.
Pickering helpfully contrasts his own views with social
constructionism and the 'strong programme' in sociology
of knowledge. His criticism of the latter is that, whilst it
claims that psychiatric categories reproduce social factors,
the details of the analogy between the medical and the
social do not allow an explanation or reduction of the
medical in purely social terms. It does not debunk medi-
cal psychiatric distinctions described in their own terms.
Similarly, social constructionism, properly understood,
need not threaten the reality of psychiatric classifications.
A sceptical conclusion about classification is not war-
ranted by what is plausibly socially constructed.
The strong programme in the sociology of knowledge
sought to show that mental illness was a reproduction
of a social exclusion of some form. But it tripped up
over the idea of reproduction. The sceptical social con-
structionist... seeks to show that ADHD is an individ-
ualisation of a social problem and so to unmask it. But
it does not allow for the possibility that to individual-
ise a problem might represent something other than a
political environment or force. I have argued that in
fact it represents a medical conceptualisation or force.
[12]
The argument for the metaphorical status of mental ill-
ness proceeds by a kind of via negativa: dismissing alterna-
tive views that mental illness is a simile or secondary
sense. Pickering also distances himself both from Szasz's
suggestion that it is a metaphor and thus a deception of
sorts and also from Champlin's criticism of Szasz. This last
contrast is helpful in setting out the positive view. Picker-
ing reports, favourably, Champlin's account of Szasz thus:
[Szasz] is saying that so-called mental illness and
physical illness are completely different kinds of
things linked only by metaphor... [13]
Champlin also agrees that 'Metaphor involves two things
between which a gulf of difference lies such that it can be
bridged only in the language' [14]. Thus Champlin's own
attempt to show that mental illness is not a metaphor
turns on deploying the 'logical continuities' [15] between
mental and physical illness. But Pickering argues that
Champlin's approach cannot work because, again, it is a
likeness argument. The supposed continuities are not
independent of a prior view that mental illness is indeed
illness.
Pickering himself does not quite subscribe to the view of
metaphor just summarised. He thinks that there may be
continuities and yet the application of the classification
still be a metaphor:
Metaphors are not utterly ruled out by logical continu-
ities. If mental illness is a metaphor, there may still be
continuities or likenesses. The point here is that if
there are such continuities, they do not play a role in
the assignment of kind contained in the metaphor.
[16]Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:9 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/9
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The problem with this account is that the idea of items
being linked 'only by language' or of features not justify-
ing the application of a term but being somehow consti-
tuted from it are very dark indeed and smack of a
nominalist account of language which is neither spelled
out nor justified in the book. (Talk of items being linked
only by metaphor looks itself to be a metaphor!) But there
is one further clue to what 'metaphor' might mean.
In a later example – the body as machine – Pickering
argues that 'we cannot find facts about the body that will
enable us to dispute whether or not it is a machine' [17].
The facts and the overall view 'come and go all together'
[18]. This is again a statement of his critique of the like-
ness argument. So the precise model of metaphor which
lies at the heart of his claim depends again on the likeness
argument. Thus the heart of the book is the discussion of
the likeness argument in the first half and it is worth ques-
tioning just what Pickering's diagnosis really achieves.
We are not sure that the criticism is as successful as Pick-
ering suggests. His central claim is that detectable and
observable features of a condition, a putative illness, can-
not be described without begging the question of the
pathological status of that condition. This is not, however,
a surprising claim. If the correct description of the features
is taken to imply a pathological status then, of course, it
cannot be independent of the overall status. But even if it
merely provides evidential support, Pickering has really
only undermined a foundational version of the likeness
argument. But most accounts of scientific theories now
accept the theory dependence of data and an essential
holism in theory testing. Most would reject a foundational
approach to data, as Pickering himself later reports [19].
Rejecting foundationalism in favour of scientific holism
does not show that the likeness argument (or some ver-
sion of the likeness argument) cannot work as part of a
broader investigation of illness. Nor does it amount to the
stronger claim Pickering sometimes makes expressed in
passages such as:
The causal and dysfunctional features of schizophre-
nia and alcoholism are created in the light of the kind
of thing they are thought to be [20]
The relevant features of alcoholism do not, contrary to
what it demands, exist independently of the category
into which alcoholism is placed. [21]
These are radical constitutive claims that amount to a
form of idealism about mental and behavioural features.
The holism that Pickering highlights only establishes an
epistemological point: that we cannot establish or know the
nature of the features of a condition independently of
establishing or knowing an overall classification. This is
not the same as saying that the features are constituted as
the features they are through human judgement.
So something akin to the likeness argument that Pickering
protests against is still possible with the proviso that it is
not thought of as a kind of foundational project. Judge-
ments about mental and behavioural features and overall
judgements about conditions form part of a larger pack-
age of ideas which have to be judged as a whole. This in
turn threatens Pickering's account of metaphor unless he
can find a way to unpack the distinction between items
that are linked independently of linguistic categorisation
and those whose connection depends on categorisation. If
not, most of what he says is of a piece with the idea that
in science, as elsewhere, observation and conceptualisa-
tion go hand in hand.
This is not, however, to play down the importance of Pick-
ering's book. His careful articulation of shared assump-
tions by many working in the area and his critique of a
foundational version of a central argument are very useful
contributions to the literature as is the development of a
novel alternative metaphorical approach. It will be inter-
esting to see whether Pickering's is the last word on the
status of mental illness.
Giovanni Stanghellini Disembodied Spirits and 
Deanimated Bodies
Within the second area of our threefold division of recent
philosophy of psychiatry, Giovanni Stanghellini's Disem-
bodied Spirits and Deanimated Bodies [22] attempts to pro-
vide an account of what the experience of mental illness is
like. Stanghellini works within a tradition of bringing
phenomenological tools and analysis to bear in clinical
findings that dates back to Jaspers. His book seamlessly
weaves the two aspects together in order to provide an
empirically grounded, but at the same time philosophi-
cally informed, account of core mental illnesses such as
schizophrenia. But Stanghellini does not take an uncriti-
cal view of Jaspers. He argues that Jaspers' own approach
to phenomenology is too intellectual, individualistic and
depersonalised. Instead, drawing on ideas of Heidegger,
Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty he argues that
[psychopathological] phenomena can only be gath-
ered by interactive (emotional) involvement, not by
dispassionate observation; concepts should not be
used as labels of experience, but as expressions which
function in an interpersonal context. [23]
Stanghellini suggests that the right path for psychopathol-
ogy is suggested by two aspects of its history in the nine-
teenth century. Firstly, and negatively, he suggests that a
future psychopathology should be contrasted with thePhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:9 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/9
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move to place sufferers in asylums: a move, he implies,
that was in part influenced by epistemological assump-
tions about the nature of madness. Subjects were spatially
isolated in order to reveal the individualistic origins of ill-
ness. Secondly, he suggests that a seed for a better view of
psychopathology can be found in early descriptions of the
conditions labelled 'hebephrenia', 'catatonia' and
'heboidophrenia'.
Positively, these emphasised observable characteristic
behaviour. Negatively, however, the descriptions
rescinded away from the significance  of behaviour and
were described in almost mindless, behaviouristic terms.
Thus Stanghellini commends as standing out the account
of hebephrenia given by the psychiatrist Ewald Hecker in
which patients' early life and experiences were described
as a clue to their later state. This provides the germ of the
idea defended in the book that 'schizophrenia is a pathol-
ogy of the dialectical process between your own bare indi-
viduality and the mores and institutions to which you
belong' [24].
The central substantive claim of the book is that schizo-
phrenia is a breakdown of common sense. More precisely
it involves a breakdown of three distinct areas: the ability
to synthesize different senses into a coherent perspective
on the world (coenesthia); the ability to share a common
world view with other members of a community (sensus
communis); and a basic pre-intellectual grasp of or
attunement to social relations (attunement). Drawing on
the work of Aristotle but also more recent phenomenolo-
gists Stanghellini says: 'The philosophical kernel of my
proposal is to show how all these dimensions of the phe-
nomenon of common sense (coenesthia, sensus commu-
nis, and attunement) are related to each other' [25]
The central chapters then outline how a description
framed in philosophically rich language can be given of
schizophrenia, as well as melancholy, manic depressive
psychosis, verbal acoustic hallucinations and delusions.
Psychopathological descriptions and philosophical
accounts go hand in hand so that, for example, Aristotle's
account of coenesthia sheds light on but is also illustrated
by descriptions of schizophrenia. For example:
Schizophrenic persons experience a world in which
sensory self-consciousness is disrupted. The sense of
aliveness, the feeling of being embedded in oneself,
the unity of self-experience is disrupted. This involves
the experiencing of a dualistic Cartesian form of exist-
ence in which embodied self-consciousness is substi-
tuted... by incorporeal noetic self-consciousness....
[They] often describe their condition as that of a dean-
imated body or a disembodied spirit. Lack of sensory
self-consciousness entails the feeling of being a lifeless
body. [26]
Stanghellini describes his book as an essay: a piece of
work firmly situated within a tradition but also critical of
it and suggesting new developments. It comprises ten
chapters or 'studies' and, although these are related, most
are, more or less, independent pieces. Both the non-linear
structure and the densely inter-textual style of writing
makes this, at first, a difficult read. Some stages of the
argument seem to go a little too quickly (such as the criti-
cisms of 'behaviourism/functionalism', 'structural func-
tionalism' and 'cognitivism'). Claims from Aristotle,
Husserl or Merleau-Ponty are simply put forward without
further initial justification or assessment. But in the main
the idea is that the account as a whole stands or falls
together. It is overall a hermeneutic project: if it gives a sat-
isfactory theoretical description of both normal and
abnormal psychology then that is an indication of its suc-
cess.
There is, however, a tension at the heart of the project.
One of Stanghellini's key aims is to understand mental ill-
ness according to descriptions given by sufferers them-
selves. But this is no easy task. Stanghellini himself offers
a diagnosis of the difficulty:
Listening to a person affected by schizophrenia is a
puzzling experience for more than one reason. If I let
his words actualize in me the experiences he reports,
instead of merely taking them as symptoms of an ill-
ness, the rock of certainties on which my life is based
may be shaken in its most fundamental features. The
sense of being me the one who is now seeing this sheet,
reading these lines and turning this page; the experi-
ence of perceptual unity between my seeing this book,
touching its cover and smelling the scent of freshly
printed pages; the feeling that it is me the one who
agrees or disagrees with what I am reading; the sense
of belonging to a community of people, of being
attuned to the others and involved in my actions and
future; the taken-for-granted of all these doubtless fea-
tures of everyday life, may be put at jeopardy. [27]
At the start of the book Stanghellini expresses some scep-
ticism about Jaspers' claims about the 'ununderstandabil-
ity' of psychopathology. But this remains a feature of the
clinical encounter. The passage continues:
Although my efforts to understand, by suspending all
clinical judgement, allow me to see these persons' self-
reports as a possible configuration of human con-
sciousness, I must admit that there is something
incomprehensible and almost inhuman in these expe-Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:9 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/9
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riences, something that makes me feel radically differ-
ent from the person I am listening to. [28]
This suggests, however, that the analysis offered might
have a kind of 'as if' quality. The problem is that the
explanatory framework of a breakdown of common sense
presupposes the kind of (shared) intelligibility that, as
Stanghellini reports, may be lacking. If it is, then it is not
clear how much it makes sense to ascribe a breakdown of
common sense or whether, by contrast, it serves as a kind
of limit to understanding. The worry is that if common
sense – in Stanghellini's specific sense – is a precondition
for intelligibility then ascribing a breakdown of it cannot
be part of an interpretative project. It would be, instead,
an explanation from outside shared understanding.
In fact, Stanghellini seems to suggest that his aim is not so
much a stable interpretation as a kind of piecemeal task
which turns on shared emotional responses, as much as
narrowly intellectual tools. In articulating some aspects of
how such a task might go whilst at the same time explain-
ing why it may prove so difficult, philosophical psychopa-
thology faces its central challenge.
Derek Bolton and Jonathan Hill Mind, Meaning and 
Mental Disorder
In the new version of Mind, Meaning and Mental Disorder
[29], Derek Bolton and Jonathan Hill take up an historical
dichotomy that was first brought to attention in psychia-
try by Karl Jaspers in his General Psychopathology: the dis-
tinction between reasons, or meaningful connections, and
causes, construed in terms of natural laws. An explanation
of an action or behaviour by reasons looks very different
from a causal account, and reason vocabulary seems to
provide explanatory power that is not available through
more basic causal resources. As a specific offshoot of the
generic mind-body problem, the attempt to reconcile
these two approaches to explanation has been the subject
of much debate, with the tide of reductionist materialism
taking meanings to be reducible to causal properties.
Bolton and Hill argue that meanings are causes but with-
out attempting to reduce the former to the latter. This is
achieved by redefining the boundaries of causation, aban-
doning the reason versus cause divide and replacing it
with a distinction between intentional and non-inten-
tional causation. Causation is intentional where behav-
iour, action or even more basic non-mental phenomena
are best explained in terms of information carrying states.
This incorporates much of the realm of biology in addi-
tion to psychology, thus shifting the boundary between
the traditional 'natural sciences' and the domain of psy-
chology. Moreover, intentional causation can be under-
stood when couched in terms of function, as having its
origin in biological systems that fulfilled the evolutionary
purpose of survival. The main project of the book is
devoted to setting out and justifying this thesis, before
attempting to use the analysis to develop accounts of
intentional explanation and mental disorder that render
psychological phenomena explicable in the same way as
biological events.
The authors' motivation for developing the intentional
thesis arises from the undeniable predictive power of
behavioural explanations given in terms of meaningful
mental states, which is taken to indicate that mental states
are causes of intentional behaviour. This premise is com-
bined with the intuitive notion that the brain causally reg-
ulates action, and these two ideas are reconciled by the
'encoding thesis', which states that meaning is encoded in
the brain. It is argued that this position allows meaningful
mental states to be incorporated into a respectable science
whilst simultaneously deferring to philosophical objec-
tions to reductive materialism and allowing that such
states possess intentionality.
Given the distinction between intentional and non-inten-
tional causation Bolton and Hill go on to describe how
certain biological processes such as the regulation of
blood pressure can be understood as instances of inten-
tional causation. They do this to remove the connotation
of 'mentality' from the idea of intentional causation and
show that such an account can comfortably sit within a
naturalistic framework and successfully explain phenom-
ena that have traditionally been understood in terms of
physical-causal processes. Locating the subject matter of
psychology on a par with biology is intended to draw psy-
chology closer to the realm of science whilst maintaining
the insight that many psychological phenomena are irre-
ducibly meaningful and necessarily involve interactions
with the world.
The latter part of the book utilises the philosophical con-
clusions of the former part to argue for new interpreta-
tions of mental disorder as a whole, as well as focusing on
several individual conditions specifically. The idea that
biological systems possess intentionality opens up a nor-
mative dimension of explanation that does not arise in
systems described at the purely physical-causal level. If a
system can be assessed in terms of its functioning, it can
be construed normatively, as either something that can
function correctly or something that can dysfunction and
go wrong.
A disorder arises when the intentional causal system is
somehow disrupted, whether the cause is social, environ-
mental, genetic or some other physical factors. The cause
may be a non-intentional-causal factor or it may be a
breakdown caused by competition within intentional
causal systems.Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:9 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/9
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In contrast to non-intentional causality the elements
of intentional-causal processes do not necessarily
work in harmony If we assume that the efficient func-
tion of an intentional-causal sequence in a physiolog-
ical system has evolved over several million years, then
the learning of new rules for perceptions and actions
over hours, days, months, or even a few years, may
seem to be a precarious truncation of the process! [30]
The authors use contemporary models of psychological
disorder to support an analysis of several recognised con-
ditions on an intentional-causal basis. They suggest that
there is a complex interplay between intentional and non-
intentional causal processes that biological psychiatry has
historically overlooked, and outline several examples
where their position may usefully serve to explain abnor-
mal behaviour. The advantage of such accounts is that
they can provide explanatory power irrespective of the
supposed aetiology or causes of the dysfunction: thus we
are not committed to 'explanations' of behaviour only
being possible when physical-causal factors have been dis-
covered.
This analysis serves as a model for philosophical investi-
gation of psychopathology. But there remain some key
difficulties with the book. One issue is how precisely the
thesis that the brain encodes meaning should be under-
stood. A second and related difficulty is an ambiguity
about the concept of 'information' throughout Mind,
Meaning and Mental Disorder. In places it appears to be
used synonymously with 'content' or 'meaning' and thus
helps defuse philosophical puzzles about how meaning is
part of nature. But it can play that defusing role only
because it is introduced in a much less philosophically
charged way as, for example, what is encoded in patterns
of neural transmission. It is now commonplace to use the
concept of information in such sub-personal contexts. But
this then raises the question of how information intro-
duced in that manner can also be identified as informa-
tion in the sense of mental content. What qualifies sub-
personal information as personal level content is, presum-
ably, the context in which the transmission occurs, i.e., in
the brain of a subject situated within a worldly environ-
ment. But if so, the neuronal firing pattern itself (the state
within the brain) cannot be said to be information in the
sense of content. Furthermore, given the authors' claim to
be taking a broadly Wittgensteinian view of meaning, it
would be inconsistent if they took such firing patterns to
be the vehicles of content since Wittgenstein, famously,
rejects inner vehicles of content. So precisely what it is that
is supposedly encoded in the brain remains unclear after
lengthy discussion.
Bolton and Hill have attempted to re-evaluate the domi-
nant Humean analysis of causation and show where psy-
chiatry can progress on the basis of a new framework, in
which the boundaries between reasons and causes are
revised. Furthermore, they show how an analysis of men-
tal disorder can be based on such a philosophical model.
But it seems that more work is needed to clarify the heart
of the new model.
Pat Bracken and Phil Thomas Postpsychiatry
Postpsychiatry is perhaps best thought of as fitting the third
aspect of our taxonomy. However it does not work within
a conventional picture of the scientific status of psychiatry
as it critically places assumptions about scientific psychia-
try in a broad historical context.
In Postpsychiatry [31], Pat Bracken and Phil Thomas, psy-
chiatrists who have trained in philosophy, aim to over-
turn several fundamental assumptions about the nature of
mental health work and psychiatric practice and advocate
a new approach to mental health that does not rely on
narrowly medical definitions and treatments. Bracken and
Thomas use the term 'postpsychiatry' to refer to the new
approach, emphasising its position within an historical
context as a progression beyond modernism. They set out
their position in contrast to two deeply embedded aspects
of the modernist assumptions found, they argue, in psy-
chiatry: the primacy of science and its methodological
focus on the individual.
Briefly tracing the development of ideas from Enlighten-
ment thinking, Bracken and Thomas argue that faith in
the ability of empirical science to yield progress and
answers to questions about natural phenomena is a foun-
dational assumption of academic psychiatry:
This continues to be the governing ideology of many
academics: that the authority of psychiatry is based on
its identification with science and technology [32].
Additionally, Enlightenment concerns with the nature of
subjectivity led psychiatry to subscribe to a form of meth-
odological individualism whereby disorders are under-
stood as pathologies of mechanisms or processes 'inside'
the individual. This is true as much for Jasperian phenom-
enology and psychoanalysis as it is for biological psychia-
try. The authors are keen to highlight that these are not
merely abstract academic issues. The Enlightenment focus
on reason and the authority of medical expertise in deal-
ing with madness have historically been tools of justifica-
tion for using psychiatry as a means of social control,
exclusion and coercion, and this is an issue at the heart of
current debate about the role and nature of mental health
services.
Bracken and Thomas emphasise that their position is not
anti-science; rather, they are concerned to reflect on thePhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:9 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/9
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limitations of modernist thinking and reject its claims to
foundational, universally valid knowledge:
postmodern thought does not involve a rejection of
reason, science or technology...postpsychiatry is about
a realization that the...guiding assumptions of mod-
ernist psychiatry are only that: assumptions [33].
Following an initial outline of the policy background in
the English NHS and the recent rise in user-led research,
Bracken and Thomas move onto their central analysis.
They discuss the 'gaze' of psychiatry, effectively guiding
the reader through a brief history of the way Western psy-
chiatry has perceived its subject matter. On the way, the
views of Jaspers and Chomsky are briskly contrasted with
Heidegger and the later Wittgenstein to demonstrate how
different strands of Cartesian theoretical perspectives have
shaped psychiatry's grasp of its subject matter.
Following this historical analysis, Postpsychiatry goes on to
offer a positive analysis of the current state and possible
future of psychiatric theory, policy and practice. They aim
to dispute the modernist assumptions by challenging the
presumed superiority of the scientistic approach to psy-
chiatry, arguing that it should be tempered and set within
a context where the methods and applications of science
and technology are open to debate. Further they propose
that mental illness can only be understood, explained and
treated if social, cultural, familial, political and environ-
mental factors are taken into account, rather than exclu-
sively focusing on establishing empirically robust
diagnoses and developing treatments on the basis of
symptoms and diagnostic categories alone:
Postpsychiatry is our attempt to subdue the bright
light of medical science: not because we want to get rid
of it or to deny its benefits, but because we believe that
the insights of other approaches are equally important
and valuable. [34]
The framework of postpsychiatry is intended to provide a
context in which clinical expertise is not only a matter of
diagnostic judgement but also sensitivity to a multitude of
priorities, values and pressures.
The mechanics of this project are set out in the second half
of the book, with detailed discussions on such topics as
first person narratives in illness and recovery, the implicit
assumptions inherent in taking psychiatric case histories,
and the implications of the proposed approach for policy
and mental health in a global context. On the basis of
their experience of psychiatric practice in the north of Eng-
land, Bracken and Thomas detail some of the practical
implementations of their revised approach to dealing
with psychiatry and mental health that have successfully
been put into place. Community groups as Sharing Voices
Bradford place explicit emphasis on the centrality of the
user and his/her needs and values for mental health serv-
ice and care.
Contrary to the cynicism of much postmodern literature,
Bracken and Thomas are cautiously optimistic about the
prospects for postpsychiatry as a framework for imple-
menting effective mental health care across different cul-
tures and communities. They are keen to emphasise their
distance from the pro/anti-psychiatry dispute arguing that
the debate has moved into a new arena of discussion
about best practice for dealing with mental distress. Psy-
chopharmacology, for example, is not simply dismissed
as an instance of scientism but should instead be dis-
cussed and offered in the context of an open, meaningful
relationship between patient and professional.
Given the heavy philosophical and historical artillery
used to set up the key tenets of postpsychiatry, the ques-
tion naturally arises as to whether Postpsychiatry success-
fully hits its target. Crucially, the analysis of psychiatry is
grounded in a critical analysis of the conceptual founda-
tions of academic psychiatry. Much of the philosophical
legwork is directed towards this critique, with the propos-
als of the postpsychiatry enterprise seemingly arising by
default as the preferred approach once the limitations of
the modernist approach, centred on control, individual-
ism and the epistemic primacy of science, have been real-
ised. Perhaps inevitably, in a book that covers such a
broad range of topics within this interdisciplinary field,
the relationship between philosophical argument and
practical implications is at times tenuous, and it is not
entirely clear precisely how the positive proposals for
practice are justified or explained by the philosophical
argument against modernity.
But philosophical and historical argument is not the only
support that Bracken and Thomas appeal to. They argue
that postpsychiatry is not only warranted in principle but
is already beginning to have explicit positive effects, as evi-
denced by their own personal experience as psychiatrists
working with community and service user groups in and
around Bradford. These examples, rather more than the
conceptual arguments, provide evidence for the efficacy of
at least aspects of postpsychiatry in practice. The slogan
'Ethics before Technology', for example, represents a sig-
nificant shift towards service-user centrality and the
importance of cultural contexts in understanding mental
health issues.
The strengths of Postpsychiatry do not lie in its attempt at
historical and philosophical analysis so much as its out-
line of proposals for how psychiatric care should be devel-
oped. Its forward-thinking approach is backed up by aPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:9 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/9
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detailed though somewhat narrow sweep of the philoso-
phy, history and development of psychiatry through a pri-
marily humanistic critical lens, lending it an impressive
philosophical artillery with which to support its main
claims. It is a manifesto for a shift in thinking about men-
tal illness that encourages multiple perspectives, opinions
and voices to become visible and taken seriously in the
ongoing effort to provide beneficial mental health care to
those in distress.
The two final books considered here are edited collec-
tions.
Julian Hughes, Stephen Louw and Steven Sabat 
Dementia: Mind, Meaning and the Person
Whilst the nature of the scientific and evaluative status of
psychiatric diagnosis, or the meaning or content of bizarre
delusions such as thought insertion, cry out for philo-
sophical discussion, dementia, although a depressingly
familiar condition, might be thought to be of less philo-
sophical interest. But, as Dementia: Mind, Meaning and the
Person, edited by the old age psychiatrist Julian Hughes,
the geriatrician Stephen Louw and psychologist Steven
Sabat, makes clear it strikes at the heart of our understand-
ing of what it is to be a human subject [35].
By far the most common theme in this collection is how
dementia threatens the status as a person of those who fall
victim to it. But this prompts a further concern, reflected
as a subsidiary theme of this collection: if the personhood
of sufferers can be lost, will this not lead to a justification
for abusive practice?
Most of the essays attempt to argue that personhood is not
in fact undermined by dementia. We will consider a small
proportion of the more central papers.
In a short paper, Harry Lesser distinguishes between two
broad senses of 'personal identity'. One, corresponding to
the main philosophical use of the phrase, is the sense of
being the same individual person over time. The other,
more common in psychology and sociology, is a person's
conception of themselves. Focusing on the first, Lesser
suggests that, whatever precisely (human) personal iden-
tity comprises, it involves the possibility of decline,
including mental decline. 'The effects of dementia do
damage the awareness of one's identity and can be partic-
ularly serious and troubling. But they give us no philo-
sophical ground for saying that the identity has been
destroyed, or that the relationship with them has been
destroyed or should be ended...' [36]
Whilst this is a promising suggestion it does not explicitly
address the arguments that dementia does undermine
personhood because personhood is essentially tied to
memory and memory is attacked by dementia.
John McMillan adds to Lesser's account a subtle variant.
McMillan draws substantially the same distinction under
the terms 'quantitative' versus 'qualitative' identity. Sug-
gesting, with Lesser, that quantitative identity is not
changed by dementia he argues that qualitative identity,
which he connects to a notion of narrative, can be. Fur-
thermore, he suggests, without further development, that
sufficient change in narrative identity might indeed
undermine duties and obligations by others to such a suf-
ferer.
Jennifer Radden and Joan Fordyce develop the idea of nar-
rative a little further. Again, adopting a distinction, drawn
in this case from Ricoeur, between simple sameness
('idem') and a broader notion of self identity which
involves a dialectic of self and others ('ipse' or 'ipseity')
they argue that the latter has important connections to
narrative. This enables them to go on to argue that identity
in this second sense is the result of active collective
authorship. Identity is 'a partly aspirational construct'
[37]. There is a degree of selection in the construction of a
meaningful self narrative. The process is active and social.
This view has consequences for dementia.
Ricoeur's emphasis has been on the way the formation
of a person's ipse identity depends on and is matched
by the ipseity of those around them. But his account
readily allows us to extend the 'bipolar' or reciprocal
phenomenon to cover the sustaining of the dementia
sufferer's ipse identity through the attention of others.
[38]
There is, however, a central difficulty in assessing these
claims. If the claim is as radical as Radden and Fordyce
suggest then the construction involved cannot merely be
one of social factors causally affecting individual person-
ality. Everyone can agree that that is possible. Instead it
needs to be a stronger claim – that personhood is consti-
tuted by social factors – but that requires much more
explicit justification.
Social constructionism is itself is criticised by one essay in
the collection (Thornton). In another, Michael Luntley
provides a considered alternative constitutive account of
personhood a consequence of which is that the self can
itself be lost in severe dementia. Luntley's account is
broadly Kantian. He argues that whilst Lockean theories
of the self take for granted the identity of ideas or thoughts
entertained by a subject they struggle then to give an
account of the principle that gathers together a set of
thoughts as belonging to a particular subject. (Narrative
approaches might be thought to be neo-Lockean givenPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:9 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/9
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Luntley's terminology.) One problem is that no attempt
to take the self as something that can be infallibly tracked
in thought seems promising given that most accounts of
such tracking of objects, deriving, e.g., from Russell, pre-
suppose the unity of the self that does the tracking.
Luntley argues, instead, that the self should be
approached as that which makes the tracking of objects
possible. The self is not tracked but is constituted partly by
an ability to keep in contact over time with objects in the
outer world. That clue in turn can then be unpacked by
looking at the constitutive abilities for keeping track of
objects. But it raises the following sort of threat to the
unity of a self. A breakdown of sufficient severity of the
ability to bind ideas together over time such as, for exam-
ple, to keep track of objects in the world, indicates a loss
of self. Notwithstanding such a subject's (if that is the
right word) use of the pronoun 'I', without the underlying
cognitive abilities, Luntley's account suggests that no self
remains.
Whilst the majority of essays in this collection blend
empirical, philosophical and ethical ideas together and
aim to defend the view that selves continue to exist under
the severe stress of dementia, it is worth indicating that it
by no means follows that treating sufferers with dignity
and respect requires that to be true. Dementia might
indeed threaten the personal identity of a sufferer without
justifying otherwise apparently abusive treatment.
Bill Fulford, Katherine Morris, John Sadler and Giovanni 
Stanghellini Nature and Narrative
Finally, edited by the series editors Bill Fulford, Katherine
Morris, John Sadler and Giovanni Stanghellini, Nature and
Narrative [39], the launch volume of the series, is a collec-
tion of essays reflecting the variety of topics within the
burgeoning domain of philosophy of psychiatry. The
papers come from a wide range of theoretical and meth-
odological perspectives, drawn together by the editors as
examples of new ways of thinking about ethical and con-
ceptual issues in psychiatry. With articles covering topics
from the law to phenomenology, the sheer diversity of
subject matter highlights the scope of this emerging field.
Despite their diversity, all the papers point towards a
rejection of the explanatory authority of reductionist
materialism that has recently pervaded the theory and
practice of psychiatry. Such reductionism is evidenced by
the recent predominance of psychopharmacology: its bio-
chemical method of action has been perceived not merely
as one possible approach to the treatment of psychiatric
symptoms, but as the fundamental root of psychiatric dis-
orders.
Although the book is explicitly conceived as the first book
in the series and hence in one sense introduces the new
philosophy of psychiatry, it does not contain introductory
or more basic material so much as serve as a launch pad
for other texts in the series, to engage the attention of a
wide readership from a multiplicity of backgrounds, lay
and academic alike.
Inevitably, in an interdisciplinary book that is designed to
appeal to a wide audience, the philosophical argument is
not always as careful and painstaking as one would expect
from a single topic philosophical text. Similarly, descrip-
tions of psychopathological phenomena are at times
abbreviated. Nonetheless the collection contains a
number of articles with particularly original ideas or
insight, or deploying established ideas to broach new con-
ceptual terrain in psychiatry, from the perspectives of phi-
losophy, ethics, psychology, phenomenology and science.
In one of his last papers, the late Wittgenstein-scholar
Gordon Baker explores Wittgenstein's project of providing
'therapy, not theory' by dissolving apparent philosophical
problems through clearer understanding of the concepts
involved, drawing parallels with the nature of psychother-
apy. In another chapter, the phenomenologist Eric Mat-
thews uses Merleau-Ponty's notion of embodied
consciousness to steer between biological reductionism
and an anti-psychiatric dismissal of the reality of mental
illness, in an article that perhaps best summarizes the new
direction of thought in the field.
Discursive and constructionist approaches to mental dis-
order are considered by both Rom Harré and Grant Gil-
lett, again with the emphasis placed on the inadequacy of
the medical model and physical-causal concepts in
explaining and understanding disorder. The focus is less
on articulating a precise, positive account of the discursive
approach than on criticism of opposing positions. Phe-
nomenological perspectives on body dysmorphic disor-
der and schizophrenia are delivered by Morris and Depraz
respectively, providing specific examples of how the appli-
cation of phenomenological arguments can help account
for and explain behaviours and actions that seem incom-
prehensible from a strictly medical standpoint.
Heinimaa's paper on the un-understandability of some
aspects of psychiatric disorders addresses a central issue in
the philosophy of psychiatry, querying whether the words
and behaviour of mentally ill individuals are essentially
meaningless, or have an underlying meaning that is sim-
ply not accessible from a viewpoint of one not afflicted by
the illness. This has implications for philosophical discus-
sions on the normativity of meaning and the determina-
tion of mental content, but also direct practical
implications for the ability of a professional or clinician to
understand a patient and establish a meaningful thera-
peutic relationship. Such issues are of key importance toPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:9 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/9
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psychiatry, and Heinimaa's discussion will hopefully pro-
vide a platform for further debate in the area.
More so than other books so far published in the series,
Nature and Narrative is an explicit attempt to introduce a
broad spectrum of readers to philosophical concepts and
issues underpinning mental health care. Whilst this
means that at times things go rather quickly, it gives a
sense of the developing field that will hopefully attract
and intrigue potential readers.
The future of philosophy of psychiatry
If the International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry
represents some of the themes making up the present state
of philosophy of psychiatry, what of the future?
One possibility is that the diversity of the new philosophy
of psychiatry is a temporary phenomenon. It might be, in
Kuhnian terms, an aspect of the revolutionary birth (or
rebirth) of the subject within broader analytic or Anglo-
American philosophy. If so, one might expect it to evolve
into its normal science phase, characterised by an agreed
agenda of puzzles to be worked through within an agreed
methodological framework. It might become more like
the philosophy of mind or epistemology with a settled
role within the philosophical canon.
However, we do not believe that the subject will or should
evolve like this. Philosophy of psychiatry, or more
broadly, philosophy of mental health care is primarily a
philosophy of and for mental health care. It is at its best
when it responds to questions and examines the concep-
tual underpinning of developing thought in this area. This
in turn makes prediction of the future of philosophy of
psychiatry difficult.
But, if we are to engage in a little 'futurology', it seems rea-
sonable to expect that, in the short to middle term, there
will be development in response to concerns currently
arising in broader backgrounds of mental health care and
philosophy. To pick a few areas in which we expect to see
further development:
From the practice side, we expect a growth of emphasis on
the role of the individual in diagnosis and assessment, in
line with increasing dissatisfaction with a reductionist
medical model of mental illness. Furthermore, the devel-
opment of models of comprehensive diagnosis and
assessment by the WPA will prompt discussion of how
individuality or subjectivity is best captured, possibly in
narrative or other terms. However, the notion of an indi-
vidual-based or, perhaps, ideographic (by contrast with
nomothetic) component in comprehensive diagnosis is
potentially in conflict with a second change in emphasis
expressed by the APA: the need for the next revision of the
DSM to possess validity as well as reliability. Conven-
tional, nomothetic models of validity have typically
emphasised the need to prescind away from individual
'surface' details to capture underlying structures, and this
is in tension with the recent emphasis on the need to cap-
ture precisely the surface details that comprise a subject's
experiences and go to make up a meaningful life as whole.
The task of resolving this tension will come to the fore-
front of discussions of psychiatric taxonomy and diagno-
sis as new editions of the DSM and ICD are developed.
There has been a longstanding aim on the practice side to
develop models of mental health recovery which are not
merely negatively characterised as the successful treatment
of illness. Whilst some progress has been made by the
'recovery movement' there has been little philosophical
input to help to articulate a genuine alternative under-
standing as to recovery might comprise and how it con-
nects to empowerment, the avoidance of stigma and other
key concepts. We expect work on the 'logical geography' of
these concepts that will contribute to how the idea of
recovery is understood.
From the philosophy side, the recent growth of embod-
ied, embedded and enactive approaches to characterising
human experience within philosophy of mind promise
also to shed light on psychopathological experience. We
expect that enactivism from the broadly analytic philo-
sophical stable will be used to augment more traditional
continental philosophical resources to characterise the
phenomenology of mental health and illness. Addition-
ally, we also expect it to be explored as a resource to con-
trast with representationalist approaches for interpreting
data from brain imaging experiments, particularly where
structural or functional differences in such brain imaging
data are touted as evidence for the aetiology of specific
psychopathologies.
Another development from the philosophy side is a resur-
gence within moral philosophy of virtue ethics. This
emphasis on the nature of the moral agent has so far been
extended, within philosophy, to epistemology, in so
called virtue-epistemology. But it promises also to shed
light on the nature of expertise involved in clinical judge-
ment -judgement of both facts and of values – and to sug-
gest the limits to what can be explicitly codified.
Within the UK there are currently two issues high on the
health care policy agenda, on which research in philoso-
phy of psychiatry could potentially influence. These con-
cern human rights and risk analysis.
The IPPP edited collection on dementia illustrates well
how the human rights of sufferers could be ignored,
owing to a denial of the status of personhood to a patient;Publish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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a difficulty that is relevant across the field of mental health
where the rationality of a patient is in question. Related
concerns regarding autonomy, coercive treatment and the
deprivation of liberty on account of potential risk,
although typically considered to be predominantly ethical
issues, are highly contentious areas of debate in which we
consider a clearer understanding of the meaning of sub-
jects' experiences would be invaluable. A more explicit
acknowledgement of the range of societal values in play in
such assessments may additionally contribute to the for-
mation and implementation of future mental health pol-
icy.
Overall it seems then that we live in interesting philo-
sophical times, in which there is potential for a fruitful
crossover between the disciplines of philosophy, psychia-
try and mental health care that may generate a genuine
and beneficial impact on mental health practice. We look
forward to the next stage of the development of the phi-
losophy of mental health, both for the conceptual chal-
lenges that will be posed and the longer term differences
it could make to mental health care.
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